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HOW SERIOUS IS THE THREAT OF 
IMPEACHMENT? AND TO WHOM? 
Harold Baer, Jr.* 
THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS-A CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS. By Michael J. Gerhardt. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. 233. $29.95. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION1 
ARTICLE! 
Section.2 .... The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker 
and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.2 
Section.3 .... The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach­
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affir­
mation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief 
Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the 
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.3 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Of­
fice of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party 
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment, and Punishment, according to the Law.4 
* * * 
ARTICLE II 
Section. 2 .... [The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves 
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases 
of Impeachments 
*** 
Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
* Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., is a United States District Court Judge for the Southern District 
of New York. B.A. 1954, Hobart; LL.B. 1957, Yale. - Ed. 
1. I have set out in detail the Articles and Sections of the U.S. Constitution that bear 
directly on impeachment. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
1598 
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Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors. 6 
While a slender volume, The Federal Impeachment Process7 of­
fers the reader a variety of different insights on this topic, beginning 
with the debates at the Constitutional Convention and running to 
the modem-day practice of impeachment trials by committee rather 
than by the full senate. Impeachment is valuable reading, not just 
for those of us interested in American history, or those of us who 
are public officers of the United States, but for every American 
who wants to understand his or her morning newspaper better. Not 
only does it lift the veil of darkness surrounding the impeachment 
process, it provides a focus for the perceptions of all those who are 
concerned over the recent spate of impeachment threats.s 
As Professor Gerhardt9 notes at the outset, impeachment was 
not a major consideration at the Constitutional Convention. The 
most prominent ratification document discussing the federal im­
peachment process - and, of course, a series of other issues - was 
The Federalist Papers (p. 12). The Federalist Papers provided an 
overview of the model replicated by the convention - and the 
model, it turns out, follows the impeachment procedures adopted 
by the most populous states. The model has an unmistakable 
theme often overlooked by some in Congress today, to say nothing 
of President Clinton: that impeachment is an appropriate remedy 
only where a public officer has committed a criminal act while in 
office. Furthermore, the view of the Framers was that removal 
from office and disqualification from holding future public office 
was to be the only punishment. This is quite different from the pat­
tern in England at the time, where not only were private citizens 
subject to impeachment, but criminal penalties could and would be 
imposed and by a bare majority of the House of Lords. Clearly the 
Framers sought a uniquely American variation of the impeachment 
process (pp. 4-5). 
Professor Gerhardt has a writing style that enables the reader to 
feel that he is sitting at a desk just behind the delegates, absorbing 
the debate. He describes in some detail each of the various plans 
that were put forth at the convention. 
6. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4. 
7. Hereinafter Impeachment. 
8. Those threats may have escalated with a decision of mine involving an unlawful search 
of an automobile here in New York and the suppression of some 80 pounds of heroin and 
cocaine. See U.S. v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated on reconsideration, 
921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But it quickly escalated to include such respected mem­
bers of the federal judiciary as Martha Craig Daughtrey of the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals, and Judge Thelton Henderson of the Northern District of California, who preliminarily 
enjoined California's affirmative action voter initiative among others. 
9. Professor of Constitutional Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law; lecturer in Govern­
ment, College of William and Mary. 
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While the plans differed in several ways, the wrongdoing that 
would constitute an impeachable offense was probably the most di­
verse and included, at one time or another, malpractice, neglect of 
duty, malversation and corruption before reaching, by an eight-to­
three vote, the language, "bribery and other high crimes and misde­
meanors." The author fails to note how treason crept into the final 
language. He does note, however that it was not until August 1789 
that a report was published advocating that the House of Repre­
sentatives should have the sole power to impeach. Interestingly, 
even at that late date, the report went on to provide that the trial 
that followed impeachment by the House would occur before the 
Supreme Court. As it turned out, "[t]he delegates ultimately 
agreed that the Senate posed the fewest problems of the various 
proposed trial courts. When the full convention voted on the Sen­
ate as the trial body for impeachments, only Pennsylvania and Vir­
ginia dissented from the proposal to make the Senate the 'sole' 
court for impeachment trials" (p. 7). Perhaps most importantly for 
academics and certainly for history buffs, we learn from Impeach­
ment who was on each side of these significant issues and why. 
WHO SHOULD BE IMPEACHED 
One could not help but draw some parallels between the de­
bates at the Constitutional Convention as to the officeholders to be 
included in the impeachment orbit and the modem-day independ­
ent counsel statute. In that statute, some seventy souls were finally, 
and often after a painstaking review of hundreds of officeholders, 
included amongst those men and women from the Executive 
Branch subject to investigation by the special prosecutor. The 
Framers, on the other hand, chose to paint with a broader brush: 
they simply used the words "all civil Officers"10 - a phrase that has 
wrought some havoc in the latter part of the 20th Century, at least 
amongst constitutional scholars. We learn how this issue has been 
defined and redefined by interpretation and history over the last 
200 years. Clearly, the language targets the Executive Branch and 
the Judicial Branch but, as Professor Gerhardt takes pains to note, 
not the Legislative Branch (p. 76). 
One cannot help but wonder why or whether the Framers be­
lieved that oversight by the legislature was necessary to discipline 
the Chief Executive and his appointees, including the judiciary, but 
not the legislature itself. Perhaps the Senate thought, at least as to 
judges, that life tenure and the requirement that there be no dimi­
nution in compensation was of such importance as to require an­
other branch of government to look after them. Hamilton believed 
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
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that these incidents of office alone would be sufficient to ensure 
judicial independence and the omnipresent prospect of impeach­
ment would not dampen that·independence (pp. 16-17). I wonder. 
Yet Professor Gerhardt recounts how the impeachment of Senator 
Blount of Tennessee initiated by John Adams provided the back­
drop for a debate which culminated in the refusal of the Senate to 
include its members within the reach of the impeachment net. In­
stead, on July 8, 1797, the day after Senator Blount was impeached 
by the House, the Senate expelled the Senator by a vote of twenty­
five to one (p. 48). Ever since, the Senate has taken unto itself the 
role of meting out any necessary discipline among its members. 
The book is in large measure devoted to the impeachment pro­
ceedings against the judiciary. The book chronicles at length almost 
every judge ever subject to articles of impeachment by the House, 
whether successful or not. In these chronicles, Gerhardt raises and 
provides historical perspective on other provocative questions. For 
instance, should it be fair gam� to indict and convict a federal judge 
for criminal activity before impeachment or should impeachment 
be the sole remedy by which to unseat ari Article III judge? Alex­
ander Hamilton was prominent in this debate at the Convention. 
His view, as expressed by Professor Gerhardt, was to the effect that: 
The Constitution sets forth the grounds for impeaching the president 
in a different place from its provision that every impeachable official, 
including the president, is "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgement, and Punishment, according to law." Yet, Hamilton read 
this text as providing that a president would first be impeached and 
removed from office and "would afterwards be liable to prosecution 
and punishment in the courts of law." Given that the constitutional 
convention delegates did not discuss the preferred order of impeach­
ment and legal actions and that the Constitution does not state in so 
many words that a president's liability at law should attach only after 
he has left office, Hamilton's re�ding seems to have assumed its con-
clusion. [p. 16] · 
The language of the Constitution raises a variety of other similar 
conundrums; another discussed at length by the author is the lan­
guage that seemingly calls for the Vice President to preside at all 
impeachment trials. If followed slavishly, it would, of course, leave 
him or her to preside over his own .or her_ own impeachment trial. 
IMPEACHMENT FOR WHAT?. 
For me, the most interesting theme throughout the volume is 
the in-depth study of what "high crimes and misdemeanors" means 
and how that meaning has changed froin the days of our country's 
Founders. The change is highlighted by the background wrongs for 
which those impeached, primarily judges, have been charged. 
When all is said and done, one comes to the frightening realization 
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that then-Representative Gerald Ford's remark that an impeach­
ment offense is "whatever a majority of the House [considers it] to 
be at a given moment in history," may hit the mark (p. 103). While 
many may have believed, as the Framers did, that "high crimes and 
misdemeanors" meant that some sort of criminal act was an essen­
tial predicate for impeachment, this view may have deteriorated 
over time into little more than a fantasy. History supports the 
proposition that such a predicate has rarely been necessary and 
makes the Ford pronouncement all the more real and all the more 
frightening. 
Take, for example, the plight of United States District Judge 
John Pickering of New Hampshire. In 1803 he was the second of­
ficeholder to be impeached under the Constitution. The vote was 
forty-five to eight. The articles of impeachment charge him with 
drunkenness and profanity on the bench. No criminal conduct was 
alleged or proven. Indeed, his son argued he was too ill and so 
incapable of exercising any sort of judgment as not to be a fit sub­
ject for impeachment. The Senate voted llineteen to seven to con­
vict and twenty to six to remove him from office (p. 50). While this 
would appear to expand the "high crimes and misdemeanors" lan­
guage of the Constitution beyond all bounds, that is just the 
beginning. 
If this sort of activity is truly what the Framers had in mind -
and few believe it was11 - impeachment of federal judges is no 
more extraordinary and equally as fragile as the calumny practiced 
by some city- and state-appointing authorities today. The city- and 
state-level appointment and reappointment process may depend 
less on merit and more on some assurance that the judge will follow 
or has followed the appointing authority's political philosophy. Of 
course such conduct cannot help but have a chilling effect on judi­
cial independence. The author suggests that the impeachment and 
conviction of Judge Pickering may have been aberrational and 
occurred 
"because the question of guilt was put in the form of asking senators 
whether the judge stood guilty as charged, " rather than whether the 
acts he allegedly committed constituted impeachable offenses. In 
other words, the Senate's vote to convict may not reflect an acknowl­
edgement by the Senate that violations of impeachable offenses were 
actually involved. [p. 51] 
While the author supports his argument by suggesting that Pick­
ering was a Federalist judge and all nineteen votes to convict came 
11. See, e.g., CliARLEs LUND BLACK, IMPEACHMENT 27-32 (1915); David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REv. 219, 248 (1998); William L. Reynolds, Luther Martin, Maryland and the Constitution, 47 
MD. L. REv. 291, 306-07 (1987). But cf. RAouL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU­
TIONAL PROBLEMS 56-57, 184-85 (1973). 
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from the Republican majority (p. 51), it provides cold comfort for 
those who maintain that for judicial independence to thrive, party 
labels must be discarded following election or appointment. 
WHO MA y IMPEACH 
Another area of concern and exploration by Professor Gerhardt 
is the recent trend toward impeachment by committee. This ap­
proach lacks, at least at the outset, involvement by the whole Sen­
ate. Some agree, with at least superficial merit, that this is another 
constitutionally infirm approach but it is within the Rules of Proce­
dure & Practice promulgated by the Senate. The infirmity, as the 
author points out, is that language in the Constitution which dic­
tates that an impeachment trial be broughr-before the whole Senate 
(pp. 116-17). 
Central to the Senate's adoption in the 1980's of a committee 
system for impeachment proceedings is the ever-increasing business 
of the Senate and the time impeachment trials take away from that 
business. This also accounts for the decreasing attendance by Sena­
tors at such trials (pp. 34-35). Of course, there are other concerns 
that have contributed to the decreased number of trials; they in­
clude the ever-changing complexion of Congress with the attendant 
frequent leadership changes. These changes, if they find the oppo­
sition in power and the public official allied with them politically, 
may result in a slowing of the process. The new approach designat­
ing twelve senators as a special trial committee to hear and report, 
utilized in connection with the three impeachment trials in the 
1980's, obviates all these problems to a greater or lesser extent. 
This approach is as follows: 
The committee prepares a transcript of the entire hearings before it, a 
neutral statement of the facts, and a summary of the evidence that the 
parties have introduced on the contested issues of fact. Neither the 
transcript nor the summary contains any recommendation from the 
trial committee as to the impeached official's guilt or innocence. [p. 
34] 
Interestingly, one or more of those three impeachment proceed­
ings followed a criminal trial, a conviction· and an affirmance by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Assuming that Congress uses its power 
in accordance with its Constitutional mandate or what appears to 
be its Constitutional mandate, i.e., impeachment for "high crimes 
and misdemeanors," awaiting the outcome of criminal charges 
makes the committee approach even more reasonable. This is so 
because once proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been estab­
lished it is less important that such proof be provided first hand to 
100 senators. While testimony is taken before less than the full Sen­
ate, the transcript is made available to all Senators. Should it reach 
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the stage where the Senate votes on the articles or charges, the full 
Senate participates. 
THE WAGES OF IMPEACHMENT 
We might ask what happens to those who are impeached and 
found guilty by the Senate. Professor Gerhardt points out at least 
one fact that has garnered far less attention than it deserves: that 
the Senate has the opportunity not only to convict or acquit but also 
upon conviction to disqualify the civil officer from ever holding fu­
ture public office. While this seems perfectly reasonable, the fact is 
that it does not always happen. Perhaps because it requires two 
separate and distinct votes by the Senate. From time to time, there 
have been impeachments without disqualification and the im­
peached officeholder remains competent to occupy yet another po­
sition of public trust. An example of this failure to act by the 
Senate resulted in the impeachment a decade ago, and the subse­
quent election to Congress in 1992 of Judge Alcee Hastings. 
Although impeached for bribe-taking, he is now at work as an influ­
ential Congressman, having been elected every two years thereafter 
(pp. 60-61). 
The book is filled with other allied revelations. Another con­
cern regarding punishment is the result of incomplete impeachment 
proceedings - a point worth recounting, especially in light of our 
avowedly budget-conscious Congress. Failing initiation (to say 
nothing of completion) of impeachment proceedings, an office­
holder may - even after a felony convictiion and exhaustion of all 
appeals - continue to draw his or her full salary and all attendant 
raises, COLAs, etc. There may be, according to the author, incar­
cerated Article III judges who continued to draw full pay due to 
unfinished impeachment proceedings (p. 172). 
CONCLUSION 
Many of those who take the time to read this book will regard it 
as simply providing a valuable analysis of the way the Framers ap­
proached the impeachment process, how it was employed over the 
last 200 years, and the more recent changes in procedure. For some 
federal judges, and to an extent some state judges, it says much 
more. For those who believe there is a world of difference between 
appropriately protected criticism of a judicial decision and a threat 
by Congress or the President to initiate impeachment proceedings 
against the judge who wrote it, this volume shrinks that world. 
In a very real way, although not likely uppermost in the author's 
mind, Impeachment provides a glimpse into the fragility of our form 
of government. At least from my vantage point as a federal judge, 
it suggests that of the three equal branches of government, one, the 
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judicial branch, may be less equal than the others. Put another way, 
if judicial independence is to remain a mainstay of our form of gov­
ernment, it will require constant vigilance. 
